Bullion
Volume 30

Number 3

Article 2

9-2006

The achievement of convergence in the Nigeria foreign exchange
market
O. O. Akanji
Central Bank of Nigeria

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/bullion
Part of the Finance Commons, Growth and Development Commons, and the Macroeconomics
Commons

Recommended Citation
Akanji, O. O. (2006). The Achievement of Convergence in the Nigeria Foreign Exchange Market. CBN
Billion, 30(3), 1-6.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CBN Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Bullion by an authorized editor of CBN Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
dc@cbn.gov.ng.

July - Sept. 2006

Volume 30, No. 3

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONVERGENCE IN THE NIGERIA FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
BY
O. O. AKANJI (MRS.)
Director, Trade and Exchange Department
Central Bank of Nigeria

O. O. AKANJI (MRS.)

Introduction
The last 10 years have seen two
important developments that have
implications for monetary and
exchange rate policy frameworks in
Nigeria. First, as capital controls
b e c a m e l e s s e ff e c t i v e , t h e
exchange rate experienced
turbulent with high level of
depreciation of Naira. This led to
the market determination of
exchange rate using the Dutch
Auction System (DAS) since 1999 which means operating floating
exchange rate regime. Floating
foreign exchange rate have gained
increased support as a preferred
system for reducing the

vulnerability of emerging markets to
external shocks.
The fact that Naira is floating is not a
panacea for effective monetary
policy management learning from
the Argentina experience. Also with
volatile capital flows, there are
associated over- and
undershooting of exchange rates
that the economy would encounter.
More importantly, the volatility
associated with floating exchange
rates, however, exposes economic
agents to risk of changes in the
assets and liabilities in their balance
sheet, as well as in their stream, of
current and expected cash flows.
Consequently, in the absence of
developed derivative markets, in
the year 2005, the foreign
exchange management was
structured to support the monetary
policy by introducing the band of
±3% to anchor the rate for effective
planning and to prevent volatility in
the financial market.

1 .0 C H A R A C T E R IS IN G

Second, inflation which has been
on the increase since 1999 was at
a single digit in 2004 and
maintained at about single digit by
end of the second quarter of 2006.
The decline was re-establishing
the fact that monetary control was
achieved after a period of
unstable double digit inflation.
These two developments have
shown that the exchange rate do
have a very strong role in
monetary policy framework either
using monetary targeting or
inflation targeting, the role of
foreign exchange management
should not be ignored.
The outcome of the exchange rate
management is also dependent
on the degree of openness of an
economy. Therefore, since the
liberalization of exchange rate
management started in 1986, the
degree of openness had been
single digit which is indicative of
some level of restriction. A double
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digit level of openness indicates the
liberalization of the external sector
management.
Table 1 shows the movements of
the degree of openness of the
economy since 1999.
The
achievement of convergence is
predicated on the degree of
openness and the technique of
intervention of CBN in the foreign
exchange market.
It has been established that central
banks in developing economies at
earlier stages of development often
intervene to support a pegged
exchanged rate and more likely
functioning as “market makers”
while developed countries central
banks intervene to dampen
exchange rate volatility. Central
Banks also enter foreign exchange
market to regulate the amount of
foreign exchange reserve (to build
reserves for intervention or to
reduce reserves to lower carrying
cost).
C o n s e q u e n t l y, t h e f o r e i g n
exchange management is first and
foremost management of a
monetary indicator. It is often a
signal of the stance of monetary
policy and if the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) is to manage price
stability then efficient management
of the exchange rate has a link with
the price level changes and interest
rate management.
This paper will discuss the
achievement of convergence in the
Nigerian foreign exchange market
in the Nigeria foreign exchange
market in five sections with Section
1 being the introduction. Section 2
discusses the exchange rate
management and monetary policy.
Section 3 dwells on the
liberalization of the foreign
exchange market, while section 4
explains the process of foreign

exchange convergence. Section 5
provides concluding remarks.
Section 2
Exchange Rate Management and
Monetary Policy
In this section, we briefly describe
the characteristics of the Nigerian
Foreign

exchange

rate

management and the implication
for monetary policy.
Exchange rate management in
Nigeria is characterized by official
intervention in the foreign exchange
market because of the level of
development. Even though the
exchange rate management
regime is a floating regime, but it
could be described as a “dirty” float.
The fear of ”clean” float has recently
come to be seen as one of the
central de facto characteristics of
exchange rate regimes in emerging
markets. The interpretation of this
phenomenon is still open to
question.
Does the optimal
monetary regime for emerging
markets with open capital markets
entail limited exchange rate
flexibility? Is the flexible exchange
rate, liquid financial market and
credible inflation targeting regime
dilemma for emerging markets a
choice between open capital
markets or monetary freedom with
no separate choice of exchange
rate policy? Does the pervasive
fear of floating indicate instead that
many emerging markets
inadvisably choose to limit
exchange rate flexibility when a
genuine floating regime would be
preferable? These are issues and
with the Chilean experience, we are
supportive of flexible exchange rate
in a liquid and deep market and with
11

credible inflation targeting
environment.
Although the literature on the
relationship between exchange
rate management and monetary
policy are versed, we discussed in
this section that exchange rate
intervention using floating regime
is optimal for monetary policy
management, taking into account
the particular economic
environment and shocks faced by
emerging markets, where
anticipation of exchange rate
policy can drive inefficient private
sector decisions.
The main
factors that are claimed to support
fear of floating ex post are the
pass-through of (excessive)
exchange rate volatility into
domestic inflation, the costs to
inflation credibility this might entail,
and the contractionary effects of
devaluation on an economy with a
high level of dollarized liabilities.
Under more rigid exchange rate
arrangements, including various
forms of pegs, central banks have
little discretion over intervention
policies. Operational aspects of
intervention, including the timing,
f r e q u e n c y, a m o u n t s a n d
modalities of intervention are
among the most important
decisions taken by monetary
authorities. Intervention is defined
as official purchases and sales of
foreign exchange to achieve one
or more of the following four
objectives:

Moderating exchange rate
fluctuations and correcting
misalignment

Addressing disorderly
market conditions characterized
by sharp fluctuations in the
exchange rate, high exchange rate
volatility, and wide bid-offer
spreads relative to calm periods,
and sudden change in foreign
exchange turn over.

Accumulating foreign
exchange reserves and;
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Supplying foreign exchange
to the market.
These objectives capture what are
known to be widely adopted policy
objectives of foreign exchange
operations in many developing
countries. However, central banks
globally face the same set of
questions on the mechanics of
intervention and these include:

Amount and timing when
and in what amount should a central
bank intervene in the foreign
exchange market?

Should the official
intervention be rules based or
discretionary?

What market factors
(liquidity, or flows, etc) should be
used to help determine the timing
and amount of intervention?

Degree of transparency
should the central bank
interventions be announced or kept
secret?

Market and counterparties
in which currency pair, instruments
(spot or forward contracts) should
intervention take place?

With whom (any authorized
dealer or primary dealers) should
the central bank trade and how
should it approach them (directly or
through brokers) to achieve its
intervention objectives?
In order to measure flexibility of the
exchange, we compare movements
in exchange rates with movements
in monetary policy instruments that
affect the exchange rate.
Examining the exchange rate in
isolation is not informative about
exchange rate policy; as it does not
take into account the shocks that
monetary policy faces. If exchange
rate is stable, we do not know
whether it was due to policy choices
despite shocks or to a lack of
shocks. To deal with this problem,
we define a flexible exchange rate

as an exchange rate that is volatile
relative to the instruments that could
stabilize it. The implicit idea is that
the policy maker faces a choice
about how to accommodate a given
external shock: it can be allowed to
affect the exchange rate if policy is
inactive, or the exchange rate can
be insulated if policy is active.
All these points showed that
exchange rate operates as
intermediate target of monetary
policy and therefore it then implies
that the domestic interest rates have
implications for the path of
exchange rate.
In an import
dependent economy such as
Nigeria, the pass-through from
exchange rate changes to inflation
is transmitted through to the
economy faster than through the
changes in the interest rates.
Section 3
Liberalization of Foreign
Exchange Market
Up till August 1986 from
independence, the foreign
exchange market operated under
exchange control. In September
1986, the Nigeria's exchange rate
framework changed with the
implementation of the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP);
which was to promote price stability
as a sound basis for sustainable
economic growth.
Since September 1986, different
exchange rate regime had been
experimented. The exchange rate
framework incorporated the basket,
band and crawl (BBC) regimes
(Williamson, 1998.1999).
First,
Naira was managed against a
basket of currencies of its major
trading partners and competitors.
Second, the CBN operated Interbank Foreign Exchange Market
12

(IFEM) as a managed float-market
based relying on inter-bank
exchange market as the core. This
resulted in serious Naira
depreciation which was not
reflective of economic
fundamentals.
Third, is the implementation of retail
Dutch Auction System (RDAS)
adopted in 2002 where the
exchange rate was determined by
auctioning with clearing rate
declared as the ruling rate. The
Authorized dealers bought foreign
exchange for their customers
account. Fourth, is the policy
adopted in 2005 whereby the
exchange rate was allowed to
fluctuate within a policy band of
±3%.
The liberalization of the foreign
exchange market since 1995 during
the implementation of IFEM
achieved some level of success
particularly with the increasing level
of reserves. The RDAS adopted in
2002 achieved among others the
following:

Naira exchange rate was
determined by the interplay of
market forces of demand and
supply

Conserve external reserves

Reduced to the barest
minimum the premium between
official rate and that of the parallel
market and/or bureau de change.

Ensure stability of Naira
exchange rate
However, the RDAS which expired
in February 19, 2006 operated for
43 months 19 days and had some
inadequacies in spite of its
achievements.
These included
cumbersomeness of its process etc.
RDAS was operated in an inherent
capital account restriction policy
environment. It encouraged capital
flight through the banks buying
foreign exchange for the customers
account. It was largely manual and
highly prone to speculation and
supported rent-seeking behaviour

July - Sept. 2006

Volume 30, No. 3
of the authorised dealers. RDAS
did not give opportunity to price
discovery which is what drives the
floating exchange rate market.
With the robust external reserve
position, bank consolidation and
fiscal discipline achieved by end
2005, on the 20th February, 2006,
CBN moved to Wholesale Dutch
Auction System (WDAS).
In addition to the objectives that
guided the introduction of RDAS,
the WDAS is aimed at:

Further liberalization and
development of the foreign
exchange market to facilitate the
convertibility of the Naira

The unification of exchange
rates between the official and interbank markets and to resolve the
multiple currency problems

Facilitating greater market
determination of exchange rates for
the Naira vis-à-vis other currencies.

Promote the efficient and
smooth functioning of the foreign
exchange market as well as
achieve a stable and realistic
exchange rate.
Section 4
The Process of Foreign
Exchange Convergence
This section documents the
process of foreign exchange
market convergence achieved at
inter-bank and official market in
May, 2006 and the three markets
convergence (inter-bank, official
and bureau de change) in July,
2006.
The WDAS implementation took off
with the expected depth and
sophistication using electronic and
computer based processing,
having tested intervention which
appreciated Naira in August and

December, 2005. The intervention
of 2005 before the implementation
of WDAS was to test the effect of
foreign inflows in the economy on
foreign exchange market and to
prove that the laws of economics of
supply and demand do work in the
Nigerian economy.
The capital flow into the Nigeria
economy since the start of bank
consolidation exercise has been
substantial and had persisted even
after consolidation.
When we
examined the type and structure of
the capital flows, we observed that
the flows are directed toward equity
with some attracted to the money
market. There are three properties
that account for crisis/volatility of
capital flows in an emerging
economy:

T h e d o m e s t i c
macroeconomic stability which is
important to external or supply
factors of the flows.

The differential between the
international interest rates and
domestic interest rates.

The financial development
and quality of institutions.
These three factors will give fillip to
the foreign exchange management.
These factors are observed to exist
now in the Nigerian economy and to
that extent it confirmed the fact that
even if the reserve accretion
reduces, WDAS would not suffer
from unstable and low volume of
foreign exchange inflows; and with
consolidation exercise completed,
the fringe banks who were engaged
in infractions would have been
eliminated. It is also believed that
the consolidated banks with the
Authorised dealership are now
operating with trust and are given
more information by the CBN to
ensure efficient and effective
conduct of the foreign exchange
market.
The success of the bank
13

consolidation exercise has
provided muscle for WDAS as the
threat of insolvency problems with
domestic money banks is a thing of
the past, coupled with the fact that
payment and communication
system has become more efficient.
WDAS market starts and ends in 2
hour (8.30 a.m. to 10.30 a.m.) and
payment is T+1 moved from T+2
before the take-off of WDAS.
The debate on capital account
convertibility and capital account
management has been strongly
influenced by specific country
experiences and so when the
WDAS was planned to take-off, it
was a signal that some level of
capital account convertibility must
also be implemented by removing
some controls on some capital
account transactions.
Consequently, the take-off of
WDAS signaled the move towards
final removal of exchange control
relics and move towards capital
account convertibility. In particular,
Chile's experience with controls on
capital inflows in the 1990s formed
the lessons that guided the moves
in the WDAS.
The control of capital mobility has
costs and benefits so also are the
removal of controls on capital
mobility. Most of the potential costs
of control are related to possible
increases in corruption and to
microeconomic inefficiencies. The
benefits on the other hand are
potentially related to reducing the
country's vulnerability to external
crises and helping the monetary
authorities achieve specific
macroeconomic objectives,
including monetary policy (liquidity
management) and exchange rate
objectives.
Consequently, the moves towards
WDAS was part of the sequencing
of the financial sector reforms and
the timing of further liberalization of
the foreign exchange market, and
removal of constraints on some of
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the capital account of the balance of
payment. CBN developed the code
of conduct for dealing in the WDAS
market, agreed on the Information
and Communication Technology
(ICT) platform and that was done on
the background of the strengthened
payment and clearing
arrangements.
WDAS which started on the 20th of
February, 2006 has addressed the
multiple exchange markets and the
exchange rates converged at the
official and inter-bank market at the
e n d o f M a y, 2 0 0 6 .
This
achievement signaled effective
foreign exchange management and
the efficiency that the foreign
exchange market has started to
witness (see figure 1)
.The WDAS is an eNOODLES
process (electronic Naira /Dollars
Exchange System). The rating of
Nigeria by Fitch rating group and
Standard and Poor rating group
placed Nigeria's foreign exchange
management at the level of the
markets in Turkey, Chile, and
Mexico. Consequently, it behooves
on the eNOODLES WDAS to
operate in the international
standard as a matter of urgency. As
an emerging market, Nigerian must
prove to the international market
that Nigeria's foreign exchange
market “can do” and will do using
any instrument to stabilize price.
The achieved convergence
between WDAS and inter-bank

occurred within a space of 12 - 13
weeks of WDAS take-off. The
following factors were supportive of
the convergence result:

The strict monitoring of the
authorized dealers open position
limits.

E ff e c t i v e c o o r d i n a t i o n
between the money market and
foreign exchange market
operations.

The daily monitoring of the
market by the foreign exchange
dealers to address any market
surprises.

The success of the
consolidation exercise.


The mopping up exercise

for liquidity management
However, the politico - economic
dynamics shifted in the middle of the
second quarter of 2006. The shift
created pressure on the
BDC/parallel market demand for
foreign exchange resulting in heavy
depreciation of the Naira exchange
rate in this market. It would have
been theoretically acceptable that
these markets are fringe market and
so should have no impact on the
inter-bank foreign exchange
market. However, the development
in the BDC/parallel market became
alarming when the conical shaped
behaviour of pricing were emerging
such that at the inter-bank market,
Naira was appreciating while it was
depreciating at the BDC/parallel
market with a premium of over

FIGURE 1
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N20/USD. Consequently, the CBN
had to strategize by doing the
following:

Study the factors
responsible for the depreciation of
Naira at the BDC/parallel market

Have open discussions
with the operators of the
BDC/Parallel market and the
Authorized dealer and Travelex to
understand the dynamics of the
market.
It was observed that there were
supply shortage and so the supply
side of resource allocation was
deployed. It was also observed
that the harmony between the
money market and foreign
exchange market must be
strengthened. The exchange rate
is exogenous to money market
operators while the interest rate is
exogenous to foreign exchange
market and both require having
consistency in resource allocation.
The CBN then took the decision in
March, 2006 to allow the BDCs to
the official market as brokers. The
brokerage was to have the BDC
operators come to buy cash at the
official windows twice a week and
thus increased the supply of dollar.
The CBN sells a sum of
US$40,000 (forty thousand
Dollars) per week to the brokers.
The increased supply of dollars,
the continuous liquidity
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management in response to
monetary policy target ensured that
Naira was not overheated and the
further liberalization of
documentation at the demand end
resulted in the convergence of the
official, inter-bank and BDC/Parallel
markets observed in July 2006 (see
Figure 2).
In addition to macro-policy issue, is
the operational issues of ensuring
that banks quote two-way and that
there is discipline in the spread. In
this dispensation, the market is one
market and there is no more CBN
effective rate as the CBN dealers

are always in the market calling for
quotes (bid/offer), buying and
selling apart from the spot market
that operates twice a week.
Consequently, the CBN Chief
Dealer must deal profitably within
the established targets he must
operate within the market. The
Director of the market has also
been given target and must deal
within target. The dealers and the
director of market are continuously
trending to gauge the market and to
ensure effective conductive of the
market. (see figure 3).

FIGURE 2

FIGURE 3
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Section 5
Summary and Concluding
Remarks
The goal of this paper is to provide
insight into the achievement of the
exchange rate convergence in the
three markets, thus eliminating the
multiple foreign exchange markets
in the economy. There are
supportive factors which had been
discussed in the paper. In the last 20
years, foreign exchange
management suffered tremendous
depreciation even when economic

